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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we consider an oligopolistic model with conjectures concerning the price variations 
depending upon the agents’ production increase or increase. By introducing the notion of an 
interior stable equilibrium, we analyze the behavior of groups of consumers with different 
consumption abilities. The proposed techniques allow us to make a qualitative description of 
dependence of the market price upon the active demand component.   
 
 
Introduction  
 
hen studying the oligopolistic market in the framework of the classical models [1]—[3], besides the 
questions of an equilibrium existence and its computation, a lot of attention is usually paid to comparing 
the latter with the equilibrium in the perfect competition model.  Recently [4]—[5], both models were 
included in a united class of oligopoly models where the degree of influence on the whole situation by each agent is 
modeled by some special parameters (influence coefficients). If we set these influence coefficients in an exogenous 
way, then the demand structure does not affect the production regime, i.e. the dependence of output values upon the 
market price.  Although a deformation of the demand curve leads to a variation of equilibrium, the possible modeling 
of the deformation influence in such models is limited. For example, it is difficult to trace a rapid (or even jump-like) 
variation of the market price, a stable price under the demand growth (within certain limits), and a series of other 
phenomena. 
 
However, if one does not consider the influence coefficients as given beforehand but includes them in the definition 
of the equilibrium itself, together with the equilibrium price and production volumes, one obtains a possibility to 
simulate the above-mentioned effects. Such a notion of equilibrium was introduced in the paper by V.A. Bulavsky 
[6]. There, the influence coefficients are determined by a special verification procedure that checks their consistency.  
The procedure in [6] supposes that each agent can observe the variations of the aggregate production output as a 
response to his own output variations and thus estimate his influence. The choice of the aggregate production volume 
as the observed parameter was done due to the fact that the classical Cournot model was taken as the basis of the 
developed model. Nevertheless, one can assume that it is more natural to observe the market price instead of the 
aggregate output, and hence estimate each agent’s influence upon the price. Such an approach is developed in paper 
[7], which allowed to relax the conditions imposed on the demand function and keep on in essence only one of them, 
namely its being non-increasing when the price increases. A technical condition for the latter function of being 
piecewise smooth is also kept valid.  
 
In such a framework in [7], the equilibrium existence was established, and certain consequences of the demand 
structure variations were examined. Namely, two types of variations were illustrated. The first one is related to the 
fall down of  consumption ability of  one  group  of  consumers  with  the  consumption  ability  of  another  group  of  
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consumers kept intact. It turned out that the proposed model predicted three stages of the process: (i) the price going 
down with the aggregate production output kept constant, (ii) the price going down further with the simultaneous 
production decreasing and a deficit arising, (iii) and at last, a sharp jump of the price without production growth, and 
the deficit disappearing on account of the poorer consumers abandoning the market.  
 
Before mentioning the second type of the demand structure variations we insert a certain elucidation. In the classical 
oligopoly models, the aggregate bargain volume decreases as the price grows up. This fact goes in line with the 
postulate of the price falling down as the supply increases. However, there exists a dual (in a certain sense) postulate: 
the price increases as the demand goes up. In order to remove this seeming contradiction, one should make 
distinction between two kinds of demand: a passive and an active one.    
 
The standard demand function in the classical oligopoly models describes the passive demand: the consumers are 
waiting for a good to be proposed to them at some price and then decide to buy it or not. However, the active 
demand does not depend on the price and constitutes the additional component of the aggregate demand.  So when 
the active demand increases the market price should grow up. 
 
It is the growth of the active demand component that is the second type of the demand structure variations examined 
in [7].  The active component may reflect both an agitating demand and the demand related to some needs outside 
the model. For example, it could be a demand arising because of some military actions, development of the defense 
material production, etc.  It was shown in [7] that the active demand growing, in the presence of a group of passive 
consumers, also provides three phases to be observed: (i) the price kept invariable while the production goes up, (ii) 
the constant price with the constant production volume and hence, a deficit appearing, (iii) and at last, the price 
jumping up as the market is abandoned by the passive consumers, and only the active demand is satisfied thereafter.  
 
An interesting phenomenon was also mentioned in [7]: with both the first and the second type of the demand 
structure variations, the process is not invertible completely. For example, if the leap in price is followed by the 
active demand going down, then the price does not return to the initial level unless the active demand becomes lower 
than the initial one! Similarly, in the second example, the initial price is not reached unless the poorer group is drawn 
up to the state of the richer group but not to the poor initial state.  
 
The aim of this article is to relax the conditions under which the latter behavior of the equilibrium price takes place, 
by permitting the cost functions to be piecewise quadratic, with possible breaks of their second derivatives (but not 
of their first derivatives). 
 
In the next section, we first describe the mathematical model from [7] and then extend the techniques to the case of 
piecewise quadratic cost functions. The qualitative analysis of the behavior of the market price depending upon the 
active demand variations constitutes the last section. The proofs of the results are omitted due to the space 
restrictions, and they will be published eslewhere.  
 
Model Specification 
 
Consider 3n  producers of a homogeneous good with the cost functions   n,,i,qf ii 1 , where iq  is the 
output by producer i .  Consumers demand is described by a demand function  pG , whose argument p is the price 
proposed by the producers. An active demand D is non-negative and does not depend upon the price. The demand 
function is assumed to be non-negative and non-increasing, and also continuously differentiable everywhere except 
for a finite number of points in which both the function  pG  and its derivative  p'G  may be discontinuous. 
Because of that, we denote properly by  pG  the demand function’s left limit at the point p, whereas the right limit 
we denote by  pg . It is straightforward that    pgpG   at the continuity points while    pgpG   at the 
discontinuity ones. In the latter case,  pG  can be treated as the potential market capacity, and  pg  -- as the lower 
limit of supply preventing the price growing up. We will reflect the equilibrium between the demand and supply for a 
given price p by the following pair of inequalities 
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           
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.                                              (1)       
We collect the above assumptions into the formal assumption below. 
 
A1.  The demand function is defined for prices   ,p 0  being non-increasing and piecewise continuously  
differentiable one. At each of the finite number of discontinuity points there exist left- and right-hand limits of both 
the function itself (due to its monotonicity) and its derivative.  
 
Now we pay attention to cost functions which are supposed to be convex, continuously differentiable and having 
piecewise continuous second derivative. Producer  i  chooses its output volume iq  so as to maximize its profit 
value   0 iiii q,qfqp  assuming that the choice may affect the price value p. The latter assumption could be 
defined by a conjectured dependence of the price p upon the output value iq . If  so, the first order maximum 
condition to describe the equilibrium would have the form                          
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Thus we see that to describe the agent’s behavior, not the dependence of p upon iq  itself but its derivative 
i
i
v
q
p



 is important.  We introduce the minus here in order to deal with positive values of iv . Of course, the 
conjectured dependence of p on iq  must provide (at least local) concavity of the i -th agent’s conjectured profit as 
a function of his output. Otherwise one cannot guarantee the profit to be maximized (but not minimized).  As we 
suppose that the cost functions  ii qf  are convex, then the concavity of the product iqp   will do.  For instance, it 
is enough to assume the coefficient iv  (called from now on as the i -th agent’s influence coefficient) to be non-
negative and constant.  Then the conjectured local dependence of the profit upon the production output i  has the 
form     iiiiii fqvp   , while the maximum condition at ii q  is provided by the relationships 
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Were the agents’ conjectures about the model given exogenously like it was done in [4]—[5], we would allow the 
values iv  to be functions of iq and p. However, here we use the approach from the papers [6]—[7] where the 
conjecture parameters for an equilibrium are determined simultaneously with the price p and the output values iq  
by a special verification procedure.  In the latter case, the influence coefficients are the scalar parameters determined 
only for the equilibrium. Onward, such an equilibrium is referred to as interior and is described by the parameter set 
 nn v,,v,q,,q,p  11 . 
 
In order to present the verification procedure we need the second notion of equilibrium called exterior  (cf. [7]) with 
parameters iv  given exogenously.  
 
Definition 1.  The set  nq,,q,p 1  is called an exterior equilibrium for given influence coefficients  nv,,v 1 , 
if the market is balanced, i.e. condition (1) is satisfied, and for each i  the maximum conditions (2) are valid.  
 
Assumptions concerning the cost functions of the model participants are given below. 
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A2. For each n,,i 1 , the function  ii qf  is defined for 0iq  and is piecewise twice continuously 
differentiable with   00 'f i  and   0ii q''f  for each 0iq , except for a finite subset of points. 
 
Example 1.  The function defined below, being piecewise quadratic satisfies assumption A2: 
 
                             
 
 
 







.x,xx
;x,x
;x,xx
xf
2            234
21                  212
10                22
2
2
2
 
 
Indeed, it is continuously differentiable over the half-axis  ,0 , with   10 'f i and is twice continuously 
differentiable over the intervals  10, ,  21, , and  ,2 . In the key points 10  x,x , and 2x , the function 
 xf  has only one-side second derivatives which are as follows: 
 
         012101  100  ''f''f,''f , and    021202  ''f''f .         
 
In what follows we are going to consider only the case when the participants set is constant independently from the 
values iv of the influence coefficients. To provide this, we make the following assumption. 
 
A3.  At the price   0
1
0 i
ni
'fmaxp

  for any i  there exists (uniquely, due to A2) an output volume 0iq such that 
 00 ii q'fp  , moreover,  0
1
0
pgq
n
i
i 

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The latter condition guarantees that for any iv , conditions (1) and (2) can hold simultaneously only for 
 00 i'fpp  , and hence only for all iq  being   strictly positive.  
 
Theorem 1.   Under assumptions A1, A2 and A3, for any 0D  and 0iv , n,,i 1 , there exists uniquely an 
exterior equilibrium  nq,,q,p 1  which depends continuously upon the parameters set  nv,,v,D 1 . The 
equilibrium price as a function of these parameters has the left side and right side derivatives by D. Moreover, 
0pp  , and  
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Let us close the graph of the demand function by connecting the discontinuity points   pG,p  and   pg,p  by a 
vertical line. Then we obtain a line L on the plane (p,G); from now on, we will call it the demand curve, as it 
comprises all the points (p,G) satisfying the inequalities    pGGpg  . On the vertical segments of this line it 
is convenient to set    0p'G  if  pgG  , and    0p'G  if  pGG  . The exterior equilibrium 
 nq,,q,p 1  determines the point  G,p L such that DqG
n
i
i 
1
. Under the above assumptions, the 
formulas of Theorem 1 can be rewritten uniformly as follows: 
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Therefore,     00  D'pD'p  only for the equilibria associated with the corner points of the graph  L. 
Besides, if    00  D'pD'p  then the corner point is concave, while it is convex if    00  D'pD'p .     
 
Now we are ready to define an interior equilibrium. To do that, we first describe the procedure of verification of the 
influence coefficients iv  as it was given in [6]--[7]. Assume that we have an exterior equilibrium  nq,,q,p 1  
that occurred for some nv,,v 1  and D. One of the producers, say k, temporarily changes his behavior by 
abstaining from maximization of the conjectured profit and making small fluxions around his equilibrium output 
volume kq . In mathematical terms it is tantamount to restricting the model agents to the subset ki   with the 
volume kq  subtracted from the active demand. Variation of agent k production output is then reduced to the same 
absolute value variation  (but to the opposite side) of the active demand kk qDD  . If we consider these 
variations being infinitesimal, we assume that by observing the corresponding variations of the equilibrium price, 
agent k gets the left-side and right-side derivatives of the equilibrium price with respect to the active demand, i.e. his 
left-side and right-side influence coefficients.  
 
If the equilibrium point 
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1
belongs to the smooth part of the graph L of the demand function, then these 
derivatives values coinside, and the consistent (verified) influence coefficient also must be equal to this value. 
However, if (p,G) is a corner point, then the coefficient kv  is admitted as consistent if it lies between the left-side 
and right-side derivative values of the equilibrium price. Applying Theorem 1 or, which is the same, formula (3) to 
calculate the derivatives, one has to remember that agent k is temporarily outside the equilibrium model, hence one 
has to exclude the addendum with the number i=k. Having that in mind, we come to the following criterion. 
 
Consistency Criterion.  At an exterior equilibrium  nq,,q,p 1  the influence coefficient kv  is admitted as 
consistent if there exists a value kr such that 
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 .  Clearly, if iq is a continuity point of the second derivative of each cost 
function ki,f i   , then the previous conditions reduce to the following equality: 
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Here the values  0p'G  and  0p'G are taken at the point 

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 of the demand function graph 
L.  If kr  then  kv =0. 
 
Before we define the interior equilibrium we notice that when the equilibrium corresponds to a smooth point on the 
demand function graph then the numbers kr  must be equal for all k. Only if it is a vertex, i.e. if 
   00  p'Gp'G , the consistency criterion allows different values of  kr . Such a fact could be considered 
as natural if the graph’s breakpoints are admitted as being exact reflections of the modeled situation. However, if one 
treats the breakpoint as a convenient idealization of smooth curves with rapidly changing slops, one has to demand 
the equality of all kr  as it were the case with the smooth approximation of the demand curve. That is why such a 
case is considered distinctly in the definition of the interior equilibrium below, as it was done in [7]. 
 
Definition 2.  The collection  nn v,,v,q,,q,p  11  where n,,i,vk 10  , is referred to as an interior 
equilibrium if, for the considered influence coefficients the collection  nq,,q,p 1  is an exterior equilibrium, and 
the consistency criterion is satisfied for all k. Furthermore, if all kr  in (4) have the same value, then the interior 
equilibrium is called strong.  
 
The following theorem is an extension of Theorem 2 in [7]. 
 
Theorem 2.  Under assumptions A1, A2 and A3, there exists a strong interior equilibrium.      
 
Demand Structure and Equilibrium 
 
This section examines how variations of the demand structure affect the equilibrium price and the aggregate 
production output. We are mostly interested not in quantitative variations but the qualitative ones predicted by the 
above introduced model. Although Theorems 1 and 2 of the existence of equilibrium are valid in the more general 
case of piecewise quadratic cost functions, to understand the analysis better, we will first consider pure quadratic 
cost functions, as in [7].   
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Hence, assume first that the cost functions have the form   22 /qaqcqf iiiiii   where 0ic  and 
n,,i,ai 10  . If one is only interested in the strong interior equilibrium then formula (4) from the consistency 
criterion can be rewritten as follows: 
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where   0,r  . If  r , then equation (5) has the unique solution n,,i,vk 10  . Otherwise, the 
following assertion is valid. 
                 
Lemma 1. ([7]). For any  0,r   there is a unique solution of equation (5)   n,,k,rvv kk 1 , that depend 
continuously upon r. Furthermore,   0rvk  when r , and  rvk  strictly increases up to  0kv  as r 
increases up to zero.       
 
Equalities (2) for the quadratic functions give the linear dependences  
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 . Thus for each 
 0,r   one can determine n,,i,vk 1  from (5) and then construct the aggregate output function  
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It is immediate that  r,pQ  strictly increases by p and strictly decreases with respect to r.  Therefore the intersection 
points of the straight lines  r,pQG   with the demand curve move steadily to the right as r grows from  up to 
0. The straight line   ,pQG  describes the dependence of the aggregate output upon the price p in case of the 
perfect competition, when the producers exclude the possibility of their individual influence on the price. On the 
other hand, the straight line  0,pQG   corresponds to the maximum (for the given cost functions) claims of the 
individual influence. 
 
Now coming back to the piecewise quadratic cost functions we see that the picture is more complex. First, even if the 
influence coefficients are exogenous and fixed, the optimal response  ii v,pq will not be a linear function as before 
but a piecewise linear function. 
 
Example 2.  Consider the piecewise quadratic cost function f from Example 1 and set 50.v  as the agent’s 
influence coefficient. Using the optimality response condition (2) one easily constructs the optimal response 
production function  v,pq as follows: 
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It is easy to see that the function in question is continuous and piecewise linear.                    
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However, the picture is even more complex if we want to restrict ourselves to the case of the optimal responses with 
consistent influence coefficients n,,,i,v i 21 . Here the optimal response production functions  ii v,pq , 
n,,i 1 , and hence their sum (collective response function)  r,pQ need not being continuous, as the consistent 
influence coefficients use to change their values with respect to the intervals over which the agents’ cost functions do 
not change their second derivative.  We illustrate that by the following example. 
 
Example 3.  Consider a particular case of our model with 3n  and the agents’ cost functions given below: 
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If we set 10r and restrict ourselves to the unit cube 32110 ,,i,qi  , then               
 
                                                          221 321  a,a,a .  
 
Having substituted these parameters to the equations system (5) and solved it for the influence coefficients 
321 ,,i,v i  , we obtain 08780  09130 321 .vv,.v  .  However, if for example, 11 q while 3210 ,i,qi  , 
then  
 
                                                              2280 321  a,a,.a , 
 
therefore 0861970  091250 321 .vv,.v  ,  which leads to a small “leap” of the optimal response production 
function  11 v,pq  at the point 091321 .p  ; namely,  
 
                         ,.,pqlim
.p
1091301
009132


  whereas    ...,pqlim
.p
000056110912501
009132


 
 
Similar discontinuities occur in the breakpoints of all other optimal response production functions leading to the 
discontinuities in the aggregate response function  r,pQ .           
 
Nevertheless, the principal qualitative behavior diagram does not change greatly if we consider the piecewise 
quadratic cost functions instead of purely quadratic ones. If we demand, in addition to assumptions A1—A3, that the 
second derivative  ii q''f  does not increase along with iq , then the only difference between the cases of pure and 
piecewise quadratic cost functions is that the continuous straight lines in the first case give place to piecewise linear 
graphs with breaks at a finite number of points, in the second case. Thus, in order to illustrate the qualitative 
phenomena clearer, below we follow [7] in the graphic representation of the demand and equilibrium behavior in 
case of pure quadratic cost functions.  
 
First consider the situation of Fig. 1. Here the passive demand  pG  is zero if *pp   but equals 0G  when 
*pp  , that is, there is a momentary leap of demand. The right-side limit  pg  here is zero if *pp   and equals 
0G  when *pp  . A positive active demand 0D  somewhat lifts the demand curve up. The straight lines (or 
piecewise linear graphs in case of piecewise quadratic cost functions) numbered 0 to 2 are the graphs of the 
aggregate production for various values of r. More precisely, number 0 is attached to the case r , i.e. the 
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perfect competition. Number 1 is assigned to the case r=0, whereas 2 is numbering the case of an intermediate value 
r  in which the aggregate production graph comprises the point  00 GD,p*  . Because   00 *p'G  and 
   0*p'G  at that point, then it represents an interior equilibrium. Another interior equilibrium is associated 
with the graph point  01 D,p  where     000 11  p'Gp'G and r=0.  Strictly speaking there is the third 
equilibrium in this situation, namely the point  0D,p*  which corresponds to some  0,rr  , as in this point one 
has    0p'G  and   00 p'G . However, the latter equilibrium is unstable: any growth of the active 
demand makes the price jump up to the value 1p . 
 
Now let the economy have the state  00 GD,p*   and the active demand D starts growing up thus lifting up the 
demand curve. Until  0DD  the situation keeps changing continuously with the price *p  kept intact and the 
demand 0GD   satisfied completely.  The production increases on account of diminishing of the equilibrium 
influence coefficients (i.e. on account of r decreasing).  When the breakpoint of the demand curve reaches  line 0 
(that corresponds to  0DD   and to the perfect competition regime) then the price cannot be supported 
unchanged as 0iv , r , and they cannot be lowered anymore.  
 
The next stage of the process is reflected in Fig. 2. If the active demand belongs to the interval 
   000 GD,D , then the equilibrium is represented by the point   00 GD,p*  which corresponds to 
the perfect competition regime.  Here neither price nor production output is affected by the active demand value, but 
a deficit appears because the aggregate demand 0GD   is not satisfied. Along with the active demand growing up 
to the value  00 GD , the deficit will also go up to the passive demand value 0G . 
 
The third stage comes with the active demand exceeding the value of  00 GD . At this moment the 
equilibrium point   00 GD,p*  loses stability, the price jumps to the value *
*
pp   and the deficit vanishes 
due to the elimination of the passive demand. The economy jumps to a qualitatively new state. Although the 
aggregate production output has not fallen down, the prices are established on a level higher than the marginal costs. 
Further growing active demand will be satisfied completely on account of the corresponding growth of price.  
 
Now suppose that the active demand starts going down. It is evident that the process will not be reversed. The 
equilibrium point will stay on line 1 until the active demand reaches the value 01 DD   and the price becomes 
equal to *p  but now at the lower production level than in the beginning of the process. Further falling active 
demand will force the economy to jump to the initial state: the price *p  being intact, the output volume will 
increase up to 10 DG   having satisfied both the active and passive demands completely.  However, if the active 
demand returns only to its initial state 0D , the economy keeps staying at the equilibrium point  01 D,p  of Fig. 1, 
the price will be fixed higher the critical price *p  for the passive demand, and only the active demand 0D will be 
satisfied.  
 
If the demand curve has not single but several steps, the behavior of prices will be similar. The only difference is in 
that the process will be repeated as many times as many steps there are to the right off line 0 in Fig. 1.  Each leap of 
prices corresponds to a switch to a new regime, with an appropriate group of consumers abandoning the market and 
thus eliminating the deficit that had arisen before that.  
 
Now consider the case when the active demand is stable but the passive demand structure changes on account of, 
say, a variation of the consumption ability of a part of consumers.  We illustrate this process on an example of two 
groups of consumers in the absence of active demand. Again we restrict ourselves to an ideal case when the demand 
curve is a step function with two steps (Fig. 3).  The price *p1  is critical for the poorer group of consumers with 
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consumption volume 1G , whereas the price 
**
pp 12   is such for the richer group with consumption volume 2G . 
The lines numbered by 0 and 1 have the same meaning as in the previous example, i.e. they are the aggregate 
production output graphs in the perfect competition regime and the maximum monopolistic tendencies regime, 
respectively. The intermediate graphs numbered as 2 and 3 are associated with two interior equilibria  211 GG,p*    
and  22 G,p* .                                                                                     
 
Now suppose that the consumption ability of the first (the poorer) group of consumers goes down. This process can 
be modeled by diminishing the critical price 
*
p1 . For simplicity purpose, we ignore a possible decrease of the 
consumption volume 1G . Again, the first stage of the considered process consists in lowering of the influence 
coefficients thus approaching the perfect competition regime. 
 
This feature will be exposed by the market price going down with the production output unchanged and the 
aggregate demand satisfied. The price will be equal to the critical one for the poorer group of consumers. This will 
be taking place until the critical price reaches the level 1p  with the production switching to the perfect competition 
regime.  
 
At the second stage when the critical price for the first group of consumers lies in the interval  110 p,p , the market 
price keeps going down along with the critical one, the perfect competition keeps being valid, but the aggregate 
production volume starts decreasing and a deficit arises (see Fig. 4). The deficit will increase as the price approaches 
the value 10p . If the consumption ability keeps lowering then the market price jumps up to the level 
*
p2 , and the 
economy makes a leap to the new equilibrium regime  22 G,p* . The poorer group of consumers abandons the 
market completely with the deficit eliminated.  
 
If the consumption ability of the first group recovers, the process is not reversed completely (if no special extraneous 
efforts are made).   
 
Conclusion 
 
The qualitative analysis of the equilibrium behavior in dependence on the active demand level for the oligopolistic 
model with piecewise quadratic cost function is realized based upon that performed in [7] by V.A. Bulavsky for the 
case of pure quadratic cost functions. Introduction of this new form of cost functions keeps valid the previous results 
about existence and uniqueness of exterior equilibrium and existence of interior one. However, the situation is much 
more difficult in the new model, as the optimal response functions with consistent influence coefficients now need 
not be continuous.  
 
In our forthcoming paper, we are going to examine the qualitative behavior of prices and production outputs for the 
case of piecewise linear cost functions.  Such cost functions arise often when the model agents have several distinct 
production facilities among which they have to distribute the production volume so that the total cost be minimal.  
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